Top Secret

SPECIAL ANALYSIS

POLAND: Looking Ahead

The government of Premier Jaruzelski in the weeks and months ahead will reduce the restrictions of the martial law regime, but it will continue to emphasize rebuilding the Communist Party, solidifying control, and imposing austerity measures. It will at some point produce a "reform" program, but only a sha'rw of what seemed possible before martial law. This combination of policies may restore economic activity, but it will not reform the political and economic system, and Poland probably is headed toward another crisis over the longer term.

If Solidarity had been able to stop all work in Poland by staging an effective general strike after the imposition of martial law, or if large-scale violence had resulted, Jaruzelski's forceful solution to Poland's economic and political problems would have failed, and his Warsaw Pact allies probably would have finished the job for him. Having undertaken such a high-risk gamble that has worked so far, Jaruzelski will not be swayed from pursuing his repressive policies until he is convinced that the need for them has disappeared.

The principal objectives of the regime in the immediate future will be to purge the party by creating a smaller, more disciplined organization; to screen officials in the government, media, and industry to assure their reliability; and to implement some austerity measures—such as a more realistic price structure—that are essential to any reconstruction of the economy.


Need To Ease Restrictions

Jaruzelski also has a need to relax martial law. Civilian communications need to be restored if commerce is to revive. The Army cannot be kept dispersed throughout the country in winter without damaging its morale and effectiveness.

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The government probably will want to release detainees to remove a point of contention with the West and the Catholic Church. These relaxations will be portrayed as signs of a return to normalcy and as conciliatory gestures to the public.

The Premier recognized that reforms were necessary long before he concluded that martial law was essential to ease pressures from Moscow and to restore domestic order. He probably will eventually keep his promise to preserve "the positive gains" of the past 16 months with a program of "reforms," but these will be designed to avoid eroding regime control over decisionmaking.

Jaruzelski probably will create new institutions for consulting the public and for giving workers more of a voice in running factories, in determining benefits, and in decisions on local social and economic issues. He will also make changes in the economic management system. None of these changes will result in the kind of decentralization or self-management demanded by Solidarity in negotiations with the government in November.

Passive Resistance Likely


This program of mixing repression with limited reforms, along with Soviet economic assistance, because of its inherent contradictions and inadecuacies, is certain to heighten tensions in the longer erm, if not the short. It will not convince the public that the martial law authorities deserve its active cooperation or that the program will lead to vigorous economic growth.

As a consequence, passive worker resistance will persist and, when travel and communications restrictions are relaxed, Solidarity will be able to rebuild more of its infrastructure. Worker militants and dissident intellectuals probably will revive such activities as an underground press and "flying" universities. Forced to balance most trade with the West and unable to offer credible incentives to workers and farmers, the government will find the economy still suffering from supply

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dislocations, an increasingly antiquated technology, and low worker productivity. A debt moratorium may be declared, or default may result.

The potential will remain for local strikes to flare up from time to time and for some violence. Even if popular resistance diminishes and some Solidarity officials collaborate with the regime, however, Jaruzelski's program is likely to come to be seen as a failure by the public, the party and government, and the Soviets. When this occurs, as it has following both previous Polish efforts at reform beginning in 1956 and in 1970, the domestic and foreign pressures for change will build again, and Poland will have another crisis.